The Suez Crisis Of 1956 And Iran Today

Yesterday, President Obama, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown delivered short, ninety-second statements asking Iran to furnish details of its newly disclosed second uranium enrichment plant and begin serious negotiations with the Security Council on 1 October. The West, including Israel, ought to be deeply concerned. As the government of Iran has had no compunction about murdering and imprisoning its own citizens to remain in power, it would seemingly not hesitate to use a nuclear weapon to blackmail the international community or 'wipe (Israel) off the map' - as stated by its holocaust-denying president.
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The West, however, must approach Iran cautiously and not give the appearance of being imperialistic. Obama, Sarkozy and Brown would do well to remember the fateful consequences of the heavy-handed approach taken by the West in The Suez Crisis of 1956.
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The Suez Canal: A Troubled Century
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The making of the Suez Canal required vast amounts of labor, complex political negotiations, broad financing and several engineering marvels. From the herculean efforts, goods from the Silk Road and the East became easily transportable by ship to the West and vice versa. Trade flourished, and nations on both sides of the globe prospered.
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Only six years after its completion in 1869, a majority share of the Canal was sold to the British government by Egypt due to mounting debts. In 1882, Britain invaded and occupied Egypt to secure pre-eminent status in the Middle East and ward off its colonial rivals. Many Egyptians were understandably resentful.
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In the years leading up to the historic crisis of 1956, Egypt periodically confiscated or steered away shipments intended for Israel on the Suez as a means of retaliation for its continued occupation of Palestinian land. These provocative actions proved popular with the 'Arab street'. Egypt's brazen disruptions of the Suez, however, raised red flags in London, Paris and Tel Aviv. Rather than spices and cloth, oil became the principle commodity of trade to run through the Suez by the 1950s of which Europe was largely dependent. Hence, the Continent could neither afford a natural nor a man-made disruption of its petroleum supply from the East, and the nations of Europe would take action to protect their interests on the Suez as deemed necessary.
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The Crisis
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As China and Taiwan teetered on the verge of war, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the fiery nationalist president of Egypt, decided to formally recognize Mao's Communist People's Republic of China. Western leaders, who had watched Nasser develop ever-closer ties with the Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern Europe in previous months, were incensed. In response, President Eisenhower cancelled funding for the Aswan Dam on 19 July 1956. One week later, an antagonized Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and the West was thrown into a panic. The idea of Egypt, an evolving ally of Moscow, having control of the lifeline to Europe was simply incomprehensible, and a plot was hatched between UK Prime Minister Anthony Eden, French President Guy Mollet and the Israeli government to recover the Canal by force. Inside 10 Downing Street, the British PM and other high officials talked at length over the domestic propaganda measures required to deceive the public about the scope of the operation.
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The intervention was successful militarily. Egypt was caught off guard as an Israeli-led ground force retook the Canal with aerial support from Britain and France. By not consulting the United States or its own citizens beforehand, however, Eden and Mollet managed to alienate their own constituencies and much of the world. When a livid Eisenhower threatened to take measures to destabilize the British currency unless the 'Tripartite Aggression' was ended, Eden and Mollet relented, and the first UN peacekeeping force was established and sent into the area to enforce a cease-fire.
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Long Term Ramifications
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The intervention proved entirely counter-productive. Rather than being seen as a legitimate measure to protect national security, the world considered the secretive invasion as both disproportionate and quasi-imperialistic. Although Nasser had asserted Egyptian control over the Canal, he had not interfered with international trade. Furthermore, general sentiment was on the side of Egypt. Was not the waterway fully inside Egyptian territory? The Cold War had triggered a hasty response, and Western leaders would pay for their brash decision far into the future. Strains between London and Washington appeared. The quest for national independence gained steam in Quebec as leaders were outraged at the Canadian government's support of the military operation, and the 'Arab street' began to radicalize against the West.
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If President Obama, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown are to successfully lead the international community against the recalcitrant Iranian government, they will need to approach Tehran as an equal partner and allow the leaders of Iran every opportunity to comply with UN resolutions. There must also not be any surprises. A clear timetable must be established with reasonable benchmarks. While no punitive option should be taken off the table, war must be a truly last resort, and the people of the United States, Britain, France and elsewhere will not tolerate any internal propaganda to rush into war as was done in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War by Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush.
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The world can neither accept a nuclear armed Iran nor another misleading justification for war.
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(Picture: British PM Anthony Eden and French President Guy Mollet, 1956)
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J Roquen